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WAR-TIME DEPRECIATION IN OPEN HEARTH STEEL 
PLANTS AND ROLLING MILLS
It may seem strange to be writing now about conditions affect­
ing depreciation in 1917 and 1918, but when it is considered that 
there are many corporations whose liability for income and excess 
profits taxes for those years have not yet been audited by the 
Treasury Department, it will be conceded that such a discussion is 
timely. It may be safely asserted that there are many accountants 
of large steel companies who are still engaged with problems affect­
ing the 1917 and 1918 income tax returns of their companies, and 
depreciation is by no means the least important of these problems. 
The subject, therefore, may prove of interest to them as well as to 
accountants in other industries which operated under similarly 
trying conditions during the War Period.
The term “War Period” as used herein includes the years 
1917, 1918, 1919 and 1920. Although the War ended in the latter 
part of 1918, the years 1919 and 1920 were anything but normal. 
In fact, of these four years, 1920 may be said to have been the 
worst, culminating in the peak of the period of inflation. The 
last two years were “ blessed” with all the evils that usually accom­
pany such a period.
In many steel plants, 1920 witnessed the production of higher 
tonnages of steel products of all kinds than had any previous year.
The question of abnormal depreciation during the War Period 
has been considered at various times, and engineering and account­
ing authorities have thoroughly demonstrated the necessity for 
making provision therefor. The engineers of the Ordnance De­
partment, for example, made allowance for extraordinary deprecia­
tion in valuing machinery. In the charts made by them for ap­
praisal purposes, they have provided for substantial increases in 
the normal rate of depreciation in all cases where overtime work 
was a factor during War production. In their book entitled “ Cost 
Accounting,” Major J. Lee Nicholson and John F. D. Rohrbach 
have placed themselves on record as accepting the theory of ex­
traordinary depreciation where conditions are abnormal. The 
strongest authority, in the eyes of the taxpayer, however, is the 
official attitude of the Income Tax Unit. This is reflected in the 
following excerpt from Bulletin E, one of its publications: “ It is 
recognized also that property, for example, manufacturing ma­
chinery, may be subject to extraordinary depreciation due to being 
operated overtime, at an overload, or being used for some purpose
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for which it is not adapted. Under such conditions a taxpayer may 
deduct, in addition to the amount measuring the depreciation under 
normal conditions, a further sum to provide for the extraordinary 
depreciation.”
The burden of proof, however, will be upon the taxpayer to 
convince the Government as to the extent of abnormal depreciation 
which was suffered, and in passing upon this question weight will 
be given by the Unit to such factors as high production, overtime 
work, inefficiency of labor, inability to make repairs properly, and 
any other peculiar conditions which may have interfered with the 
smooth operation of machinery and equipment. These will be dis­
cussed in more detail below.
In this article, normal and ordinary causes of depreciation as 
mere efflux of time, exposure to the elements, excessive heat gen­
erated by furnaces, soaking pits, etc., corroding action of chemical 
vapors, etc., will not be considered. The unusual wear and tear 
sustained during the War Period was brought about principally by 
the various abnormal causes mentioned above and these will fur­
nish the basis for this discussion.
E ffect of H igh Production on E quipment and Depreciation
Production is one of the most important causes of depreciation. 
Machinery is purchased for the specific purpose of turning out pro­
duction or aiding indirectly in doing so. In a great many cases 
engineers can roughly estimate the approximate number of units 
of production which a machine will manufacture before it is ready 
for the scrap heap. It is logical to assume, therefore, that hasten­
ing the processes of production will accelerate the rate of depre­
ciation. One of the best illustrations of this principle is the case 
of certain, powerful cannon with respect to which it is definitely 
known in advance how many shots they can fire. While this is an 
extreme case, the same principle underlies the operation of ordinary 
machinery except that it does not work out as easily as in the 
example given.
Normally, as far as production is concerned, depreciation is 
caused by actual contact of the product with the machinery, and, 
with respect to auxiliary equipment, by the number of motions or 
movements necessary to keep in operation the equipment engaged 
directly in production. In cases of high production we have more 
production units coming in contact with what we might call 
Primary Equipment and a noticeable increase in the number of 
movements of auxiliary equipment to keep pace with increased 
production. It is true, therefore, that the demands of high pro­
duction will affect not only the equipment with which the steel in 
the various manufacturing processes comes in direct contact, but 
also auxiliary departments or equipment such as steam or electric 
generating departments, gas producers, coal pulverizing equipment, 
etc. This is patent. If high tonnage of steel is handled in the 
furnaces, there will be extraordinary usage of cranes, charging
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cars, gas producers, steam generating equipment, etc., to keep pace 
with the increased demands of the production department.
An excellent illustration of direct depreciation is found in the 
blooming mill where every ton of steel made in the open hearth 
furnaces in the form of ingots is reduced, by a rolling process, to 
“blooms.” Glancing into a blooming mill one is struck by the maze 
of machinery. Every ton of steel that passes through the rolls jars 
the entire rolling mechanism, and contributes its quota of vibration 
which in time undermines even the foundations. It logically fol­
lows that an increase in the tonnage of steel passing through the 
blooming mill, will correspondingly increase the rate of deprecia­
tion in this department.
A simple illustration of the same principle is contained in the 
experience of a steel company which built a plant in 1907. During 
the first three years of operation, production was considered of 
primary importance in order that previous production records in 
other plants of the same company might be broken. Furnaces were 
forced to produce more than rated capacity and in the process, 
important operating details were neglected to an extent which did 
not augur well for the condition of equipment. In consequence, 
after only three years of operation, it was apparent that the plant 
was in worse physical condition than another plant owned by the 
same company which had been operated under normal conditions 
for nine years. All other factors having been the same, it may be 
safely assumed that the hastening of depreciation was caused by 
abnormal production.
With regard to many steel companies the average production 
of steel in the War Period was over 100% greater than the average 
of pre-war years. It is granted that in part, this may have been 
due to the installation of additional open hearth furnaces or, in 
other words, to an increase in the capacity of the plant. A large 
part, however, was the result of “ driving the furnaces,” squeezing 
the last ounce of possible production out of them. From a study 
made in one plant it was found that in 1918 production had been 
increased 70 per cent over 1914. 50 per cent of this increase was 
accounted for by a similar increase in rated capacity. 20 per cent 
of the increase was a result of “ driving” for high production.
The discussion of the effects of such practice on equipment 
may be more readily understood if considered in connection with 
the following description of an open hearth furnace. Each furnace, 
although a complete unit in itself, is usually one of a series of from 
six to eight or more, built in a row. On the outside of the steel 
building in which they are located can be seen many towering 
stacks, corresponding in number to the number of furnaces in the 
plant. The furnaces are rectangular in form, being about 25 to 
30 feet long, 20 to 25 feet wide, and from 10 to 15 feet high.
There are two checker chambers at either side to permit the 
introduction of gas and air into the furnaces, in the proper state. 
The checker system extends below the floor-level and consists of a 
network of brick so arranged as to allow a draft of air to pass
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up, around, and into the furnace. The walls and arched roof are 
made of brick which are bound up and kept together by a heavy 
steel framework, consisting of buckstays, beams, etc. There are 
heavy iron doors on the front side of the furnace through which 
the “ charge” of raw material is introduced into the hearth. These 
doors are manipulated by electric or hydraulic power.
At the floor level there is a steel pan, consisting of heavy 
plates of steel, riveted together, upon which is spread a thick layer 
of magnesite and dolomite or some other refractory material. The 
inside of the furnace above this pan is usually referred to as the 
hearth. There is a tap hole at the back of the furnace through 
which the molten steel is made to flow into the large ladle at the 
signal of the melter, as soon as his practiced eye, with the aid of 
chemical analysis, shows that it is time to do so. Another item of 
equipment is the heavy steel butterfly valve which is about seven 
or eight feet high. This is part of the checker system and is the 
point at which the air enters and leaves the furnaces.
The construction of each furnace may be divided into two sec­
tions or parts, viz., a temporary section, consisting of the brick­
work and other minor items used in connection therewith; and a 
permanent one, which is made up of foundation, steel pan, checker 
chambers proper, steel framework, valve, stack, etc. This distinc­
tion is made because the brickwork is torn down every four to six 
months for purposes of reconstruction; while the basic structure 
of the furnace, referred to as permanent construction, should under 
normal conditions of operation, last about 20 years. In consider­
ing the question of depreciation, it is important that we bear in 
mind this distinction.
One of the methods used to secure greater production during 
the War Period was to increase the temperature in the hearth. 
This tended to “sweat” out the bottom silica brick lining, thus dam­
aging the steel pan. It also burned and bent the buckstays and 
framework, getting them considerably out of line, and affecting the 
entire basic structure of the furnaces.
Under ordinary conditions it is necessary to renew the brick 
lining about every five or six months. Under such conditions, when 
production is normal and well regulated, the condition of the brick 
can be carefully observed so that the furnace may be shut down for 
repairs in time. In the War Period we find things entirely changed. 
The management was pushing for production and in many cases 
took a long chance in running a furnace several additional heats, 
when the condition of the brick clearly indicated that a shut down 
was in order. The result was in many cases the flame burned clear 
through the brick and caused severe damage to the iron work, 
buckling and bending it out of shape. This rarely if ever occurs in 
normal times.
Depreciation was caused in another manner by the desire to 
meet the unparalleled demand for steel. In 1918, in order to secure 
greater production in the blooming mill, the management of a cer­
tain company attempted to use a larger sized ingot than the rolls
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and other equipment in that mill were designed to handle. This 
particular mill had been constructed to take care of ingots of a 
maximum weight of 6,600 pounds, but, in order to increase produc­
tion, ingots weighing 10,000 pounds were forced through it. The 
table rollers were not strong enough to stand the strain, and several 
serious breakdowns occurred. Experimentation went on for more 
than a year in an effort to strengthen the equipment, but all efforts 
failed and the attempt was finally abandoned. When it is consid­
ered that every pound of steel produced in the open hearths must 
have been rolled in that blooming mill, it stands to reason that the 
life of equipment in that department was shortened considerably.
Power companies broke down repeatedly during the War on 
account of the tremendous increase in the demand for electric cur­
rent brought about by high production in practically all industries. 
In one case there were three breakdowns during a single year 
which proved to be very disastrous to a certain steel company. In 
the case cited, forty minutes after power was cut off, the water 
storage supply in the stand pipes became exhausted on account of 
the pumps being down. At a result, the water cooling equipment 
around the open hearth furnaces burned up and the doors burned 
out of the furnaces. Power was cut off with a ladle full of molten 
steel suspended in mid-air. The steel froze, seriously damaging 
the ladle. Charging machine equipment was damaged by power 
being cut off with charging box inside the furnace. Numerous 
other instances can be mentioned. The power company in this case 
furnished low voltage during practically all of 1917 and 1918, 
which damaged the electrical equipment all over the plant and 
seriously interfered with operations. This is a notable example 
of the confusion and chaos which prevailed during the war.
It is interesting to note that in many cases the War Industries 
Board allocated orders to companies which the latter were not 
equipped to handle, but which they nevertheless accepted out of 
A spirit of patriotism and a desire to do their share in winning the 
war. One company was practically forced to take orders for 
French shell steel, the large sized bloom on which work damaged 
the shears.
Production Method for Recording Depreciation
While on the subject of production and its effect on the ques­
tion of depreciation, it may not be out of place to say a few words 
on the “ Production Method”  of determining and charging off de­
preciation. Under this method a pre-determined amount is charged 
to operations for each ton of ingots and sheet steel produced. In 
other words, actual production figures are used as a basis for com­
puting depreciation. This is not an accurate method, and few steel 
companies use this basis for arriving at a depreciation charge-off, 
as there are other factors which must be considered besides pro­
duction. For example, it is obvious that depreciation is going on 
where a plant is idle. In fact, it is generally known that in some
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cases greater depreciation is sustained where a machine is idle 
than when it is operated under normal conditions, so that while 
there is a close relationship between production and depreciation, 
an increase in the former does not necessarily produce a propor­
tionate increase in the latter. In the opinion of the writer, the 
“Production Method” should rarely be used to measure actual, 
physical depreciation. This method, however, might serve effec­
tively in connection with industries depending for their existence 
on a supply of wasting assets, such as timber, for example. An 
ideal illustration is that of a sawmill located near its source of 
supply, away from an industrial center. Inasmuch as it will have 
to discontinue operations as soon as its supply of timber is ex­
hausted, and in that event the plant will be worth salvage value, 
it would be good accounting practice to set up a reserve based on 
the unit of production so that the entire cost of the mill may be 
amortized by the time the last tree is leveled.
Straight Line Method
The straight-line method appears to be the most popular one 
and is generally used by steel company accountants. In ascertain­
ing the periodic charge for depreciation under this method, a great 
many accountants use a single, composite rate which is applied to 
certain classes of equipment such as buildings, machinery, furni­
ture and fixtures, etc. The writer has seen one instance where 
plant account was sub-divided into more than fifty classifications 
and depreciation was computed on the amount of each classification 
by applying percentages which had been worked out to four deci­
mal places. An extensive discussion of all of these methods does 
not come within the scope of this paper. However, irrespective of 
the method employed, an additional provision for depreciation 
should have been made for the years 1917, 1918, 1919 and 1920. 
What that additional amount or rate should have been must be 
decided on the facts in each case and on the extent of ill treatment 
to which equipment may have been subjected.
E ffect of Overtime W ork on Depreciation
Another cause of high depreciation is overtime work. This 
was recognized by the Bureau of Aircraft Production which advo­
cated an increase of 50 per cent over the normal depreciation rate 
of factory equipment where, during the war, a plant was operated 
three shifts a day instead of one.
During a large part of the War Period many steel plants were 
operated at full blast seven days a week. Large premiums were 
being paid for deliveries of steel and this served as an incentive to 
work a plant to its utmost. In normal times, because of the nature 
of the processes necessary to convert iron into steel, a plant is 
usually operated 24 hours a day. But ordinarily the plant is closed 
down on Sundays. During the War Period many plants ran 24 
hours a day and 7 days a week for long stretches of time. Fur­
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thermore, it should not be overlooked that in ordinary times there 
are periodic shut-downs caused by lack of orders. There are 
“ slack times” when men will get off two and three days every 
week. Such shut-downs and the regular day of rest furnish suffi­
cient time in which to thoroughly inspect all items of equipment, 
make repairs and keep things generally in shipshape condition. 
It has been scientifically proved that metal is subject to fatigue. 
It follows, therefore, that a period of rest at regular intervals will 
lengthen the life of equipment. The constant vibration of ma­
chinery must have a detrimental effect upon the buildings in which 
it is located, and such rest periods will unquestionably prolong the 
life of such structures.
Ineffiency of Labor
A discussion of this subject would be incomplete without some 
reference to labor conditions during the War Period. During that 
time labor on the average was very unsatisfactory. It is the con­
sensus of opinion of mill superintendents and foremen that this 
was one of the most serious and perplexing problems that it was 
necessary to contend with during the war. Owing to the extraor­
dinary demand for men, the employee unquestionably had the upper 
hand. The situation was further aggravated by an unprecedented 
rise in wages which contributed towards a spirit of independence. 
There was a noticeable lack of cooperation and team-work.
It is significant to note that the above-described conditions 
were found to exist even in the smaller steel towns where men had 
worked in the same mills for years, some of them all their lives. 
These unfortunate conditions may be attributed to the influx of 
an undesirable type of foreign and other unskilled labor to take the 
places of the men who had enlisted or were drafted. This dilution 
of skilled forces with unskilled men must have had an important 
bearing on the state of equipment. When these two factors are 
considered: the first, that every machine, every unit of equipment, 
had to be operated or manned by men; and the second, that un­
skilled and inefficient labor had to be used, the question may very 
well be asked whether machinery was given the attention and care 
it required or whether it was manhandled.
The president of a steel company some years ago in an article 
prepared for a business course said: “Of the three factors in 
carrying on a business, neither machinery nor materials can com­
pare in importance with the human element, the workmen who 
operate the machines and handle the materials. The machines and 
materials are at the mercy of a poor workman. If he is inefficient 
or careless and indifferent, or disloyal and resentful, he can easily 
reduce them to the junk pile and the scrap heap.”  This statement 
was intended to be applied under normal operating conditions. Its 
importance may therefore be appreciated when it is interpreted in 
the light of the unfavorable conditions which existed during the 
War Period.
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The human element is more important in the steel industry 
today than when the industry was in its infancy about 25 years 
ago. In those days machinery played a much smaller part than 
it does today. The greater part of the work was done by hand, 
common labor being employed for the most part. For example, 
charging of iron into the furnace was done by hand. This was 
true also of stripping moulds and crushing scrap. Today these 
operations are performed respectively by charging machines, me­
chanical strippers, and skull crackers. Great strides have been 
made in the construction and operation of cranes and there has 
been a remarkable improvement in machinery in general all 
over the plant which has created a demand for a more intelligent 
class of labor. It must be admitted, considering the general in­
efficiency of labor during the war and the difficulty of securing ex­
perienced men to take the place of those that went to fight, that 
machinery depreciated at a greater rate than normal.
To cite one example: The craneman should be expert in
manipulating his machine and the load which it may be carrying. 
This requires great skill. Inefficient, careless, or green cranemen 
have been known to swing loads against expensive machinery and to 
damage the buckstays of furnaces. An efficient craneman can easily 
put his machine out of commission. The life of a crane will be 
shortened by running the trolley to the end of the tracks without 
putting the brakes on or by continuing to wind up the hook after 
it has reached the top, thus bending the shaft. During the War 
many cranes were practically racked to pieces by their misuse.
Steel men are in agreement on the fact that the efficiency of 
labor during the period under discussion was only 60 to 70 per cent 
of what may be considered normal. The situation became very 
acute in the latter part of 1919 when the big steel strike occurred, 
which lasted from September to November. Inexperienced men 
of the most undesirable type were brought in as strike breakers, 
because it was necessary to keep the plants running at any cost 
on account of the unheard-of demand for steel products. It will 
be generally admitted that machinery and equipment suffered by 
reason of this costly experience.
Some companies suffered more than others as far as labor 
troubles were concerned. This was especially true with regard to 
plants located away from the large labor centers. There is one 
company in particular which experienced great difficulty in secur­
ing the necessary skilled operatives. Its plant is located in Ken­
tucky and skilled men were not to be obtained at all in that section. 
Agents visited all the large industrial cities in an attempt to round 
up an experienced working force, but what few men were obtained 
in this manner were entirely unsatisfactory, being of the lowest 
type of labor on the market. The company was confronted with 
the task of breaking in the natives of that section of Kentucky. 
This was a difficult task as these men had had no previous in­
dustrial experience, most of them having been engaged in farming.
In the process of being broken in, these green country boys
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caused heavy depreciation on equipment. For example, charging 
machine operators would let the charging box get stuck in the 
furnace. Sometimes a leaky stopper would develop underneath a 
ladle with 50 tons of molten steel suspended in mid-air. The ladle 
crane operator, seeing red-hot metal flowing out accompanied by a 
shower of sparks, would become panic-stricken and run out of the 
plant, allowing the metal to damage cars, moulds and other equip­
ment. Cranemen, charging machine operators, and others who 
operated complex machinery in this plant, were instrumental in 
causing heavy depreciation without doing so intentionally.
Considering all of these facts, there can be no question that 
the low efficiency of labor during the War was responsible for a 
large part of the abnormal depreciation which was sustained during 
that period.
Inability to Make Repairs Properly
The most effective way to counteract depreciation is to make 
repairs promptly and efficiently. Some accountants consider this 
matter of paramount importance and where large amounts have 
been spent in making repairs they have correspondingly reduced the 
depreciation rates. This would seem to be a sound method where 
the increased expenditures for repairs have been carefully analyzed 
and it is found that they have succeeded in actually arresting 
depreciation.
If the above is true, the reverse is equally so; that is, if there 
was skimping in the making of repairs there must have been a 
corresponding increase in the depreciation sustained. This is 
exactly what occurred in most steel plants during the War. Pro­
duction was a sort of “Golden Calf” which was worshipped to the 
neglect of other essentials. Everything else was subordinated to 
it and every ounce of energy that it was possible to commandeer 
was diverted to increase production. There is no doubt that even 
so important an item as repairs was sadly neglected.
A case in point is the matter of painting the steel buildings. 
The open hearth building, which is constructed of steel sheeting, 
is between one and two city blocks in length depending on the 
number of furnaces it covers. Here is a mass of steel surface 
which, if not painted on an average of once each year to maintain 
it in a proper state of preservation, will rust away very quickly. 
While some companies let this job by contract to outside painters, 
a great many employ men who do nothing but paint. During the 
War these men were to a great extent diverted to the stenciling 
of boxes containing steel for shipment, and painting was neglected. 
The same was true of steel stacks and in one plant, as a result of 
such neglect, several stacks rusted away and fell over.
The soaking pits are an important example of the same thing. 
In the process of steel-making, the molten steel is first poured from 
the furnace into moulds. After the steel has solidified, but while 
it is yet red-hot, the ingot is stripped from the mould and deposited 
in a soaking pit where the heat in the ingot is distributed evenly.
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It is then ready for the blooming mill. In order to push produc­
tion, soaking pits were repeatedly continued in operation where 
they should have been shut down for repairs and relining. It is 
possible to operate soaking pits in an inefficient sort of way where 
repairs are overdue, but the pit is greatly damaged in doing so as 
slag runs down into the checkers and clogs them. When the pit is 
finally rebuilt it entails three times as much expense. Many soak­
ing pits were practically destroyed by the end of 1920 and had to 
be entirely rebuilt.
An unusually interesting example of the neglect of repairs in 
the case of a battery of two blast furnaces, recently came to the 
attention of the writer. Blast furnaces produce the principal raw 
material of the open hearths, which is pig iron. In the course of 
operations they should be shut down periodically for repairs and 
relining, and in this respect they are somewhat similar to open 
hearth furnaces. On account of the great demand for pig iron 
during the War, to feed open hearth furnaces all over the country, 
blast furnaces were operated straight through for inconceivably 
long periods of time. In the case cited, repairs were neglected to 
such a serious extent that when things quieted down the furnaces 
were in a practically wrecked condition. They had to be dismantled 
and completely rebuilt from the ground up.
Production seriously interfered with the condition of such 
equipment as cranes and charging machines. A little attention 
once a week will do wonders in keeping such machinery in good 
condition. During the War they were neglected for six months at 
a time. Normally, charging machine tracks, and all other tracks in 
the plant and yards, are inspected regularly and maintained in good 
condition. Here again, during the War, men who were engaged in 
this work were to a great extent if not entirely diverted to some 
job in the production end of the business.
The spreading of tracks, allowed to go unnoticed, caused the 
derailing of many a charging machine with damage all around. 
Spread rails in the case of charging buggies, caused them to jump 
the tracks and precipitate a load of pig iron against furnaces, 
bending and damaging the buckstays. The spreading of crane 
tracks had a tendency to derail one end of the crane and twist it 
out of shape. In several cases cranes fell to the ground and became 
candidates for the scrap heap. In the case of locomotive cranes, 
poor condition of the brakes permitted the load to come down with 
a bang, damaging whatever happened to be in the way. And so it 
went all over the plant. A loose bolt here, a leaking tube there, 
going unmended, might develop into serious functional trouble.
Not only were necessary repairs belated, but even when made 
they were made under pressure. The management would have moved 
heaven and earth, if that were possible to get things going as soon 
as possible after a shut-down. As the time in which a repair is 
made decreases, the cost increases and repairs made in this hurried 
manner are in many cases not thorough. In the sheet mills there 
is an iron bed-plate standing on a concrete foundation on which the
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mill rests. Normally, to replace such a foundation requires from 
eight to ten days’ time to permit the concrete to “ set” properly. 
During the war, the loss in production that would result from such 
an enforced shut-down was so great, considering the high prices 
that were being received for steel products, that foundations were 
made with lead, which cost from five to ten times as much as 
concrete but which did not last as long.
A situation which was of the utmost importance in connection 
with the ability to make necessary repairs, was the condition of 
the market for supplies. It was extremely difficult and at times 
impossible to secure needed materials. Ties for railroad trackage 
could not be obtained and fence posts had to be used instead. The 
brick for the furnaces were of a very inferior quality, cracked and 
crooked, although they cost over three times as much as the better 
brick which was normally secured. On this account, in many in­
stances the roof and walls of the furnaces caved in while a “heat” 
was in progress. It was extremely difficult to procure dolomite and 
magnesite as these products are imported from Austria. These 
refractory materials are spread on the steel pan in the hearth, but, 
on account of the shortage, were used very sparingly. The result 
was that holes were burned in the steel pan which permitted the 
red hot metal to flow over the open hearth floors, cars, rails, etc. 
Upon cooling, gobs of steel were frozen to the equipment which it 
was necessary to cut off by the use of a torch. This is another 
sample of what it was necessary to contend with during the War.
For a certain time, before the situation had been properly 
presented to them, some Government accountants contended that 
extraordinary depreciation was counteracted by the large amounts 
expended for repairs and replacements. The figures were very 
misleading, the repair account in some cases showing an increase 
over pre-war years of over 500 per cent. However, upon learning 
the extent to which repairs were neglected, they agreed to a sub­
stantial additional depreciation allowance.
A table showing merely the amount spent for repairs and 
maintenance each year will be found to be practically worthless for 
comparative purposes, as far as the question of depreciation is 
concerned, for the reason that it deals with dollars rather than 
with the actual amount of repairs made per unit of property. A 
statement of repairs would serve its purpose much better if it con­
tained the number of hours spent on a given unit of equipment or 
in a certain department, or in so far as practicable, the amount of 
material used in repair work by units or departments. In most 
cases it will be found that it is next to impossible or that it would 
consume too much time to set up such a statement, on account of 
the many different kinds of material used in making repairs, the 
numerous items of equipment in the plant, etc. In such cases tests 
should be made, if possible.
If a table could be prepared, using the pre-war period as a 
standard and showing the percentage of increase or decrease in
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the amount of repairs, disregarding all money values, it would in 
most cases show a decrease for the War Period, in spite of the fact 
that actual expenditures may have been 500 per cent in excess of 
the pre-war figures.
Not a small part of the increase in the repair account repre­
sents repairs made on property which was not in existence in the 
pre-war years. There are few steel companies that did not expand 
there manufacturing facilities between 1912 and 1918. Taking 
actual figures, one company whose repair account showed a 400 
per cent increase in 1918 over 1912 had a book value for plant 
representing a cost of twice as much in the latter as in the former 
year. With more units in the plant in 1918 than in 1912, it follows 
that there would be a corresponding increase in the amount of 
repairs made.
The reduction in the purchasing value of the dollar is another 
important factor accounting for part of the increase. The cost of 
labor and practically all materials which are used in making repairs 
was on an average over 150 per cent higher in 1918 than in 1912.
The following is a comparison of the cost of rebuilding open 
hearth furnaces in 1914 and 1918 in one steel plant:
1914 1918
Labor ..............................  $11,215 $49,192
B rick ................................  22,598 133,871
Bear in mind, however, that there was an increase in wages 
for this kind of work averaging 150 per cent; the cost of brick 
increased about 300 per cent; there was about 50 per cent increase 
in rated furnace capacity, representing the installation of new 
open hearth furnaces; there was a 30 per cent increase in the 
number of shut-downs for repairs.
The increase in the cost of labor and brick may be roughly 
accounted for as follows:
Labor
Cost in 1914..............................................  $11,215
150 per cent increase in cost of labor. . 16,822
$28,037
30 per cent increase in number of repairs 8,411
$36,448
50 per cent of $28,037 for increase in
furnace capacity..............................  14,019
$50,467
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Brick
Cost in 191 4 ............................................  $22,598
30 per cent increase in number of re­
buildings ..........................................  6,779
$29,377
50 per cent increase in furnace capacity 14,688
$44,065
200 per cent increase in cost of brick .. 88,130
$132,195
It should be noted that the additional number of shut-downs 
did not counteract depreciation on the basic structure of the fur­
naces. In fact, it is possible that an increase in the number of 
rebuildings might tend to weaken the basic structure. Yet, the 
additional costs entailed in rebuilding are included in the repair 
account and are partly responsible for the increase over the normal 
amount of repairs, as far as money values are concerned.
It is practically impossible to make similar comparisons with 
respect to such machinery as cranes, charging machines, etc., be­
cause of the poor condition of the records of most steel companies 
for 1914 and other limitations. In 1917 owing to the excess profits 
tax steel companies began to realize the importance of good records, 
and there has been a remarkable improvement since.
The preponderance of evidence showing the extreme neglect of 
repairs, is so great that such a comparison is not necessary. There 
is not an item in the repair account which did not cost at least 
150 per cent more in 1918 than in any of the pre-war years, but 
there are a great many items, the percentage of whose increase is 
much greater than that. For example, it has already been de­
scribed how repair of bed-plates, due to the use of lead instead of 
cement, increased the cost from five to ten times; and how the cost 
of soaking pit repairs increased 300 per cent on account of delay. 
There are countless other examples which might be given. They 
all lead to one conclusion, which is, that fewer or less extensive 
repairs were made in the War Period than in the years prior 
thereto.
Conclusion
The experiences of the various steel plants which were visited 
by the writer were found to be surprisingly uniform during the 
War Period and most superintendents had practically the same 
comment to make in regard to production problems, dealings with 
labor, troubles in making repairs, etc.
There may have been exceptional situations where abnormal
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depreciation was not sustained during that period, but such cases 
must have been rare. In the opinion of the superintendent of a 
well-known steel company, the average life of an open hearth fur­
nace operated under normal conditions should be about twenty 
years, but on account of the abusive treatment which the furnaces 
in his plant received during the War Period, their life was unques­
tionably shortened by about four or five years. In the same manner 
the life of other equipment throughout the plant was shortened. 
To determine the extent of such extra depreciation it will be neces­
sary to make a careful study of the situation in each individual case.
In closing, the writer trusts that nothing in these pages will 
be interpreted as a criticism of the attitude of steel company 
management during the War towards the various questions of 
operation discussed herein. It no doubt was better business to 
increase production at the expense of depreciation. To have at­
tempted to maintain equipment at the expense of production would 
have been “ Penny wise and pound foolish.”
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